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BIOETHICS—“WHO DO THEY THINK THEY ARE?”1: 
PROTECTING TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS AGAINST UNDUE 
INFLUENCE BY INSURERS IN STATES WHERE MEDICAL AID 
IN DYING IS LEGAL 
Mary C. Deneen∗ 
Medical aid in dying has been a controversial topic in the United States 
for decades.  Many contentious issues have arisen with the recent 
enactment of various state medical aid in dying statutes.  Are physicians 
violating their Hippocratic Oath to patients when prescribing lethal 
medications?  Do insurance coverage limitations inappropriately steer 
patients toward medical aid in dying?  Are terminally ill patients unduly 
influenced into prematurely ending their lives?  Whether or not one 
agrees with these laws, there is an obvious need for certain protections 
in place to safeguard vulnerable patients from undue influence in states 
where medical aid in dying is legal. 
 
This Note examines the history of medical aid in dying statutes and 
identifies the safeguards currently in place to protect patients from undue 
influence and coercion.  While there are specific guidelines as to who 
may qualify for medical aid in dying, there have been instances of 
insurance companies denying patients coverage for life-prolonging 
treatment prescribed by their physicians but covering the costs of a 
medically assisted death.  This Note argues that medical aid in dying 
statutes must regulate insurance companies in such a way that insurance 
payments for non-experimental treatments prescribed by one’s physician 
may not be denied to any person who qualifies under an existing medical 
 
1. Tim Christie, A Gift of Treatment: When the Oregon Health Plan Fails to Cover a 
Cancer Drug, the Drugmaker Steps In, THE REGISTER-GUARD (June 3, 2008), 
http://projects.registerguard.com/turin/2008/jun/03/gift-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/U742-
25ZL]. 
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2020.  The author 
would like to give special thanks to Professor Barbara A. Reich for her guidance and expertise 
throughout the writing of this piece. 
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aid in dying statute.  Terminally ill patients deserve protection from 
undue influence and coercion, especially by their insurance providers. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, Barbara Wagner, a sixty-four-year-old, low-income Oregon 
resident, learned that her lung cancer had returned after a two-year 
remission.2  Wagner’s last hope was a four-thousand-dollar per month 
drug that her doctor had prescribed,3 but the administrators of her health 
insurance, Lane Individual Practice Associates (LIPA), refused to cover.4  
Instead, LIPA sent a letter to Wagner, informing her that it would cover 
only palliative care, including the medications used for medical aid in 
dying (MAiD),5 which cost about fifty dollars per dose.6  Wagner was 
devastated when she found out that LIPA would not cover the medication 
that might prolong her life: “To say to someone, we’ll pay for you to die, 
 
2. Andrew R. Page, Note, What’s the Cost of Living in Oregon These Days?—A Fresh 
Look at the Need for Judicial Protections in the Death with Dignity Act, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 
233, 233 (2009). 
3. Susan Donaldson James, Death Drugs Cause Uproar in Oregon, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 
2008), http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Death-Drugs-
Cause-Uproar-in-Oregon-2008-08-06ABC.pdf.  Wagner’s oncologist had prescribed her 
Tarceva, a pill taken once a day for the purpose of slowing the cancer growth and extending her 
life.  Kenneth R. Stevens, Oregon Rationing Cancer Treatment but Offering Assisted Suicide to 
Cancer Patients Paying to Die but not to Live, PHYSICIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE CARE EDUC. 
FOUND. (June 6, 2008), http://www.pccef.org/articles/art67.htm [https://perma.cc/CRN3-
HSZH]. 
4. See Page, supra note 2, at 233.  LIPA administrates the Oregon Health Plan in Wagner’s 
county.  The Oregon Health Plan is available to adults who earn up to 138% of the Federal 
Poverty Level.  Currently, that level is approximately $16,752 per year for a single person, or 
$34,644 per year for a family of four.  See Do I Qualify?, CAREOREGON, 
https://www.careoregon.org/am-i-eligible/do-i-qualify-for-oregon-health-plan 
[https://perma.cc/9QPS-7KVK]. 
5. See Christie, supra note 1.  Opponents of this aid-in-dying process often refer to it as 
“physician-assisted suicide.”  See Browne Lewis, A Deliberate Departure: Making Physician-
Assisted Suicide Comfortable for Vulnerable Patients, 70 ARK. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017).  Proponents 
of the process frequently refer to it as “Death with Dignity.”  See generally DEATH WITH 
DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org [https://perma.cc/SV5X-L5N5].  In order to remain 
neutral, this Note will refer to the process as “medical aid in dying,” or “MAiD.”  MAiD is the 
medical process by which a terminally ill, mentally competent adult, who has a prognosis of six 
months or less to live, has the option to request a prescription for medication that he or she can 
self-administer through ingestion to shorten the dying process.  See Medical Aid in Dying Is Not 
Assisted Suicide, Suicide or Euthanasia, COMPASSION AND CHOICES, 
https://www.compassionandchoices.org/about-us/medical-aid-dying-not-assisted-suicide/ 
[https://perma.cc/R9XR-C4JZ]. 
6. James, supra note 3. 
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but not pay for you to live, it’s cruel . . . .  I get angry.  Who do they think 
they are?”7 
Unfortunately, Barbara Wagner is not the only person to have 
endured such a denial of coverage.8  Randy Stroup, another Oregon 
resident, learned that LIPA would not cover the chemotherapy prescribed 
by his physician for his prostate cancer.9  Stroup received a letter from 
LIPA, explaining that it was unable to approve his physician’s request, 
and that it would only cover comfort and palliative care, which included 
MAiD.10  Stroup was appalled at the denial of coverage: “No man is 
getting the right to offer money to have somebody else killed. . . .  To 
think they could even put a price tag on my life or send me a letter saying 
they’ll pay to kill me, but they won’t pay to help me.”11  Fortunately, after 
Stroup went public with his story, the Oregon Health Plan reversed its 
initial decision and approved his chemotherapy.12 
Although many health insurance plans cover palliative care,13 the 
medical profession generally has not handled end-of-life care effectively, 
including pain management.14  Medical providers tend to over-utilize 
hospital-based resources at the end of life, often without any benefit to 
terminal patients.15  This over-utilization of care results in dying patients 
receiving costly life-prolonging treatment, even when it is highly likely 
that increased survival is “limited or non-existent.”16  The medical 
profession’s lack of appropriate end-of-life care has increased support of 
 
7. Christie, supra note 1.  Ultimately, the manufacturers of Tarceva offered the medication 
to Wagner at no cost.  However, the drugs were unsuccessful, and Wagner died after a hard-
fought battle against her lung cancer.  The Barbara Wagner Story, MARYLAND AGAINST 
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE (Nov. 2, 2015), https://stopassistedsuicidemd.org/the-barbara-
wagner-story/ [https://perma.cc/ZGK9-TRBP]. 
8. See James, supra note 3. 
9. Stevens, supra note 3. 
10. HOW TO DIE IN OREGON (Cinedigm 2011).  This documentary follows the stories of 
various individuals diagnosed with terminal illnesses in states where MAiD is legal.  The 
documentary details the individuals’ thought processes and reasons behind their decisions to 
take, or not take, the lethal medications.  Randy Stroup is one of the individuals interviewed 
about his experience with terminal cancer and Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.  Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.  However, even after receiving chemotherapy treatment, Stroup died from his 
prostate cancer four weeks later.  Id. 
13. Palliative care refers to medical care intended to alleviate symptoms and stress 
associated with illness.  See Barbara A. Noah & Neal R. Feigenson, Avoiding Overtreatment at 
the End of Life: Physician-Patient Communication and Truly Informed Consent, 36 PACE L. 
REV. 736, 742–43 n.15 (2016). 
14. DEREK HUMPHRY & MARY CLEMENT, FREEDOM TO DIE: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND THE 
RIGHT-TO-DIE MOVEMENT 48 (1998). 
15. Noah & Feigenson, supra note 13, at 740. 
16. Id. at 741. 
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the right to die movement.17  Both hospice care and MAiD give patients 
options for maintaining control and dignity at the end of their lives.18 
Maintaining control and dignity at the end of life is central to the 
MAiD movement.19  The main motivating factor surrounding a patient’s 
decision to participate in MAiD tends to be the individual’s desire to take 
back control and to die on his or her own terms.20  MAiD laws “stem from 
the basic idea that it is the terminally ill people, not government and its 
interference, politicians and their ideology, or religious leaders and their 
dogma, who should make their end-of-life decisions and determine how 
much pain and suffering they should endure.”21  However, whether or not 
terminally ill patients truly have full control over these end-of-life 
decisions is up for debate.22 
Although the United States Supreme Court has ruled that “physician-
assisted suicide” is not a liberty interest protected under the Constitution,23 
the states are free to decide whether or not to legalize this process.24  There 
 
17. HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 14, at 49. 
18. Id. at 51–52. 
19. See CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, OREGON HEALTH AUTHORITY, OREGON 
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: 2018 DATA SUMMARY 1, 6 (2019) [hereinafter 2018 DATA 
SUMMARY], https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/
EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Documents/year21.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W6XX-URSP]; see also Liz Szabo, “Death with Dignity” Laws and the 
Desire to Control How One’s Life Ends, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/death-with-dignity-laws-and-the-
desire-to-control-how-ones-life-ends/2016/10/24/6882d1e6-9629-11e6-bc79-
af1cd3d2984b_story.html?utm_term=.beccbf9a4782 [https://perma.cc/6V3J-96K4].  “Those 
who have actually used these [MAiD] laws have been far more concerned about controlling the 
way they exit the world than about controlling pain.”  Id. 
20. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 6. 
21. Death with Dignity Acts, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/learn/death-with-dignity-acts/ [https://perma.cc/599G-
HGA3]. 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997). 
24. See Steven B. Datlof, Beyond Washington v. Glucksberg: Oregon’s Death with 
Dignity Act Analyzed from Medical and Constitutional Perspectives, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 23, 25 
(1999–2000).  In 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft attempted to block Oregon’s Death 
with Dignity Act by issuing his “Ashcroft Directive,” which authorized “DEA agents to 
investigate and prosecute doctors who prescribe[d] federally controlled drugs to help terminally 
ill patients die.”  Oregon Death with Dignity Act: A History, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/oregon-death-with-dignity-act-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/QWM4-EF3F].  However, in 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
in favor of Oregon’s MAiD statute, holding that the Ashcroft Directive was unlawful and 
unenforceable because “it violate[d] the plain language of the CSA, contravene[d] Congress’ 
express legislative intent, and overstep[ped] the bounds of the [A.G.’s] statutory authority.”  Id. 
(quoting Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
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are currently nine jurisdictions25 in the United States that have legalized 
MAiD through legislation.26  Of these nine jurisdictions, only one has 
included any provision that attempts to protect individuals against undue 
influence specifically by insurers.27  California’s End of Life Option Act 
prevents insurance carriers from informing patients about the availability 
of MAiD medications unless specifically requested by the patients or their 
physicians.28 
While this is an important and necessary provision, states with MAiD 
statutes need to go even further in protecting vulnerable, terminally ill 
patients from undue influence and coercion by insurance providers.29  The 
terminally ill may be unduly influenced by insurers based on their desires 
to avoid high treatment costs at the end of their lives;30 any undiagnosed 
depression that is impairing their judgment;31 or their wishes to avoid 
being a burden on their families and caretakers.32  Due to these 
vulnerabilities, states need to include specific provisions within their 
MAiD statutes to protect against potential coercion by insurers.33 
Such a provision should require that no publicly funded health insurer 
issuing a policy that covers MAiD medications shall exclude coverage of 
 
25. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-101 
(West 2019); D.C. CODE § 7-661 (West 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-327L (West 2019); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2140 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-1 (West 2019); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 127.800 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5281 (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 11.125.420 (West 2019). 
26. MAiD was legalized in Montana by a Montana Supreme Court ruling.  See Baxter v. 
State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1239 (Mont. 2009) (holding that physician aid in dying provided to 
terminally ill, mentally competent adult patients is not against public policy). 
27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2019). 
28. Id. at § 443.13(c). 
29. See, e.g., Fred R. Garzino, Undue Economic Influence on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 
1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 537, 561 (1997) (“If sufficiently large numbers of these patients 
can be persuaded by managed-care physicians to pursue or choose [MAiD] and die earlier than 
they might otherwise, managed-care organizations will undoubtedly enhance their profits.”). 
30. See Kathy L. Cerminara & Barbara A. Noah, Removing Obstacles to a Peaceful Death, 
25 ELDER L.J. 197, 200 (2018) (“Medicare data clearly demonstrates that the United States 
spends substantial health care dollars in the last year and, especially, in the last weeks of life.  
Approximately one-third of medical expenses for the last year of life are spent in the final 
month . . . .”). 
31. Datlof, supra note 24, at 28. 
32. See Terukazu Akazawa et al., Self-Perceived Burden in Terminally Ill Cancer 
Patients: A Categorization of Care Strategies Based on Bereaved Family Members’ 
Perspectives, 40 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 224, 225 (2010), 
https://www.jpsmjournal.com/article/S0885-3924(10)00311-8/pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
33. See generally Ryan Anderson, Purported Safeguards in Physician-Assisted Suicide 
are Ripe for Abuse, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Apr. 7, 2015), 
https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/purported-safeguards-physician-assisted-
suicide-are-ripe-abuse [https://perma.cc/7RV4-XBXZ]. 
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non-experimental, effective treatment that has been prescribed by a 
patient’s physician.34  Providing this specific language within states’ 
MAiD statutes will prevent insurers from denying prescribed, life-
prolonging treatment but offering to pay to end one’s life, as was seen in 
the unfortunate cases of Barbara Wagner and Randy Stroup.35 
Part I of this Note reviews the history and background of states’ 
enactment of MAiD statutes, and Part II outlines the ways in which 
terminally ill patients are vulnerable and lack complete control over their 
end-of-life decisions.  Part III explains why insurance providers often 
deny terminally ill patients certain treatment coverage and proposes the 
necessary provisions that states’ MAiD statutes should include in order to 
protect terminally ill patients against undue influence and coercion by 
health insurance providers. 
I. THE HISTORY OF MEDICAL AID IN DYING STATUTES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The advent of medical aid in dying and the “right to die” movement 
has had a long and contentious history in the United States.36  Whether 
through legislation, federal and state constitutional litigation, statutory 
litigation, or other means, proponents of MAiD have been fighting for 
ways to legalize the process for decades.37  The MAiD battle continues to 
be fought in the courts and amongst the public at large.38  The following 
section briefly outlines the history of MAiD and where the United States 
currently stands in this fight for “death with dignity.” 
A. Is the “Right to Die with Dignity” a Fundamental Right Protected 
by the Constitution? 
The first major case to consider the right to withdraw treatment 
concerned Karen Ann Quinlan, a young woman who was left in a 
persistent vegetative state in 1975.39  Quinlan’s father sought the New 
 
34. “Non-experimental” and “effective” treatment are defined in the text of the full 
proposed provision.  See infra notes 221–23. 
35. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text. 
36. See generally NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND 
EUTHANASIA 1 (Robert P. George ed., 2006).  “Whether to permit assistance in suicide and 
euthanasia is among the most contentious legal and public policy questions in America today.”  
Id. 
37. See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal History of Medical Aid in Dying: 
Physician Assisted Death in U.S. Courts and Legislatures, 48 N.M. L. REV. 267 (2018). 
38. Lewis, supra note 5, at 5. 
39. See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), receded from by In re Conroy, 
486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985) (finding that the court erred in disregarding evidence of 
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Jersey Superior Court’s appointment as her guardian so that he could 
make the decision to remove her respirator.40  After being denied this 
request by the Superior Court, Quinlan’s father appealed to the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey.41  The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision 
centered on Quinlan’s “independent right of choice” and held that her 
right to privacy could be asserted by her guardian under the “peculiar 
circumstances” of the case.42  The court ruled that, if competent, Quinlan 
would have the right to refuse treatment under her fundamental right to 
privacy.43 
The first “right to die” case considered by the Supreme Court of the 
United States concerned Nancy Cruzan, a young woman who was 
severely injured in an automobile accident that left her in a permanently 
vegetative state.44  After Cruzan was determined to have “virtually no 
chance of regaining her mental faculties,” her parents asked the hospital 
to terminate her life support, which would cause her death.45  The hospital 
refused to do so without court approval.46  While the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Missouri ruling requiring clear and convincing evidence that 
the patient would have refused precisely the life-prolonging intervention 
that she was receiving, under precisely the medical condition that she 
found herself in,47 the Court also established a right to die for mentally 
competent individuals under certain circumstances.48 
Supporters of MAiD have argued that Cruzan’s recognition of a 
patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment effectively established 
the “right to die with dignity.”49  However, on June 26, 1997, the Supreme 
 
statements that Quinlan made to friends “concerning artificial prolongation of the lives of others 
who were terminally ill”). 
40. Id. at 651. 
41. Id. at 647. 
42. Id. at 664. 
43. Id. at 663. 
44. See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
45. Id. at 267–68. 
46. Id. at 268. 
47. See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426–27 (Mo. 1988), aff’d sub 
nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  Missouri’s highest court 
had ultimately held that Cruzan’s statements to her roommates while she was alive did not meet 
the clear and convincing evidence requirement that she preferred death to existence in a 
vegetative state.  Id. 
48. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (“[W]e assume that the United States Constitution would 
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and 
nutrition.”).  See also Datlof, supra note 24, at 35. 
49. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The right to be free from 
unwanted medical attention is a right to evaluate the potential benefit of treatment and its 
possible consequences according to one’s own values and to make a personal decision whether 
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Court decided two cases: Washington v. Glucksberg50 and Vacco v. 
Quill,51 both of which addressed the right to assistance in committing 
suicide.52  In each case, the Court found that the state’s prohibitions on 
assisted suicide did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.53  The Court 
distinguished the constitutionally protected right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment from the right to assisted suicide.54  However, “while the Court 
upheld [each] law prohibiting assisted suicide, this [did] not [necessarily] 
mean that the Court would strike down a state law permitting assisted 
suicide.”55 
In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist “emphasized the need to 
carefully formulate the liberty interest at issue.”56  He noted that 
“extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty 
interest . . . place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate and 
legislative action.”57  The Court therefore must “‘exercise the utmost care 
whenever [it] [is] asked to break new ground in [a particular] field,’ lest 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into 
the policy preferences of the Members of [the] Court.”58  Justice 
O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, agreed: 
There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the 
proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally 
competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the 
State’s interests in protecting those who might seek to end life 
mistakenly or under pressure.  As the Court recognizes, States are 
presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physician-
assisted suicide and other related issues.  In such circumstances, 
“the . . . challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for 
 
to subject oneself to the intrusion.”).  Justice Stevens noted that, “Choices about death touch the 
core of liberty.”  Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also Datlof, supra note 24, at 34. 
50. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
51. 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
52. James E. Dallner & D. Scott Manning, Death with Dignity in Montana, 65 MONT. L. 
REV. 309, 317 (2004). 
53. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797 (holding that New York’s prohibition on assisting suicide 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. at 728 (holding that “the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a 
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause”). 
54. Datlof, supra note 24, at 34. 
55. Id. at 37. 
56. Id. 
57. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
58. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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safeguarding . . . liberty interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the 
States . . . in the first instance.”59 
Thus, the decision of whether to enact MAiD statutes has been left to 
the states.60  The Supreme Court has shown “great willingness to allow 
the states to determine their own policies regarding end-of-life decision 
making through debate and legislation.”61  Nine jurisdictions have opted 
to enact such medical aid in dying statutes.62 
B. Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (DWDA),63 the oldest MAiD 
statute in the United States, has been in effect for over twenty years.64  
Oregon enacted its statute in 1997, “allowing terminally ill Oregonians to 
end their lives through the voluntary self-administration of a lethal dose 
of medication, expressly prescribed by a physician for that purpose.”65  
Oregon’s DWDA was a citizens’ initiative passed twice by Oregon voters, 
once in 1994 and again in 1997.66  The Act went into effect shortly after 
its affirmation in 1997, and implementation began in 1998.67  In 2006, the 
Supreme Court confirmed that Oregon physicians can prescribe life-
ending medication under the DWDA without penalty from the Attorney 
General.68  As of 2018, a total of 2,217 people received written 
 
59. Id. at 737 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)) 
(alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
60. Id. 
61. Datlof, supra note 24, at 44. 
62. See supra note 25 (detailing the jurisdictions with MAiD statutes). 
63. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (West 2018). 
64. Oregon, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/oregon/ 
[https://perma.cc/7KSE-G2XX]. 
65. Frequently Asked Questions about the Death with Dignity Act, OREGON HEALTH 
AUTHORITY 1 (revised Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/
PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITY
ACT/Documents/faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/265X-L6HH] [hereinafter Frequently Asked 
Questions]. 
66. Id. 
The first time was in a general election in November 1994 when it passed by a 
margin of 51% to 49%.  An injunction delayed implementation of the DWDA until 
it was lifted on October 27, 1997.  In November 1997, a measure was placed on 
the general election ballot to repeal the DWDA.  Voters chose to retain the DWDA 
by a margin of 60% to 40%. 
Id. 
67. Oregon, supra note 64. 
68. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006) (holding that the Controlled 
Substances Act does not “prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-
assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure”). 
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prescriptions under the DWDA and 1,459 have died from ingesting the 
lethal medications since the law was passed in 1997.69 
In order to qualify for MAiD in Oregon, a patient must be at least 
eighteen years old, a resident of Oregon, mentally capable, and diagnosed 
with a terminal illness with a prognosis of six months or less to live.70  
After meeting this criteria, a patient must then take several steps to 
actually obtain the prescription, including: “making multiple requests for 
the prescription (separated by at least fifteen days); consulting with 
multiple physicians; consulting with a psychologist to screen for mental 
health issues; and attending an informational session about alternatives to 
end-of-life care, including hospice and palliative care.”71  However, 
studies indicate that “[f]ew patients have been referred for psychiatric 
assessment.”72  Between 1998 and 2016, only fifty-seven out of 1,127 
patients (5.1%) who requested MAiD medications under the Oregon 
DWDA were referred to a psychiatrist for mental health evaluation.73  
“[Psychiatrist Linda] Ganzini and [her] colleagues have published the 
only articles looking at the impact of depression in Oregon [patients’] 
requests for [MAiD medications] and the attitudes of Oregon 
psychiatrists.”74  Dr. Ganzini found that almost all (ninety-five percent) of 
the psychiatrists “were ‘confident’ that they could determine whether a 
mental disorder was impacting the decision for [MAiD] in the context of 
a long term treatment relationship, but only [six] percent were ‘very 
confident’ that they could make this assessment in a single evaluation.”75   
Dr. Ganzini’s 2008 study of fifty-eight Oregonians who requested 
MAiD found that three of the patients who received (and died from) a 
prescription for the lethal drug under the DWDA met the criteria for 
depression.76  The study concluded that, although the majority of patients 
 
69. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 5. 
70. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65, at 1. 
71. Cody Bauer, Note, Dignity in Choice: A Terminally Ill Patient’s Right to Choose, 44 
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1024, 1030 (2018). 
72. COUNCIL ON PSYCHIATRY & LAW, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, APA RESOURCE 
DOCUMENT ON PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DEATH, 10 (2017) [hereinafter APA RESOURCE 
DOCUMENT], https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Directories/Library-
and-Archive/resource_documents/2017-Resource-Document-on-Physician-Assisted-Death.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 10–11. 
75. Id. at 11 (citing Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1469, 1469–75 (1996)). 
76. See Linda Ganzini, Elizabeth R. Goy, & Steven K. Dobscha, Prevalence of Depression 
and Anxiety in Patients Requesting Physicians’ Aid in Dying: Cross Sectional Survey, 337 BMJ 
1682 (2008), https://www.bmj.com/content/337/bmj.a1682 [https://perma.cc/39YQ-TTVW]; 
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who request MAiD do not have a depressive disorder, “the current practice 
of legalised aid in dying may allow some potentially ineligible patients to 
receive a prescription for a lethal drug.”77  This conclusion supports the 
push towards “more active and systematic screening” to determine the 
need for additional professional assessment.78 
During 2018, 249 people received prescriptions for lethal 
medications in Oregon, and 168 people died from ingesting these drugs.79  
There is a discrepancy between these numbers because the patients 
ultimately hold the decision as to whether they wish to ingest the 
medication;80 some patients change their minds, some die naturally, and 
some are unable to physically swallow the drugs.81  “Of the 168 DWDA 
deaths during 2018, most patients (79.2%) were aged [sixty-five] years or 
older.  The median age at death was [seventy-four] years.  As in previous 
years, decedents were commonly white (97.0%) and many patients were 
well educated (47.3% had at least a baccalaureate degree).”82  Virtually all 
decedents (99.3%) had some form of health insurance.83  According to the 
Oregon Health Authority report, the most frequently reported end-of-life 
concerns for terminally ill patients were: their decreasing ability to 
participate in activities that made life enjoyable, their loss of autonomy, 
and their loss of dignity.84 
Oregon’s DWDA is considered a huge success by proponents of the 
MAiD movement.85  Statistical reporting has allowed an unbiased 
assessment of Oregon’s experience with MAiD, and data has shown that 
the statute’s requirements have largely been followed.86  Fears that 
underprivileged groups would be unduly coerced into MAiD have been 
 
see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 156 (5th ed. 2013) (outlining the criteria for depression). 
77. Ganzini et al., supra note 76, at 3. 
78. APA RESOURCE DOCUMENT, supra note 72, at 11. 
79. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 5. 
80. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65, at 1–2 (emphasizing the “voluntary self-
administration” of the lethal medication). 
81. See Lynn Terry, 20 Years of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, THE OREGONIAN (Oct. 
27, 2017), https://www.oregonlive.com/health/2017/10/20_years_of_oregons_death_with.html 
[https://perma.cc/8HMF-YZP9]. 
82. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 6. 
83. Id.  Most patients had Medicare or Medicaid insurance (66.9%), while some had 
private insurance (32.4%).  Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See Oregon, supra note 64 (asserting that the law “has worked as intended and without 
flaws or any evidence of abuse or coercion”). 
86. However, during 2018, “two physicians were referred to the Oregon Medical Board 
for failure to comply with DWDA requirements.”  See 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, 
at 3. 
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unfounded,87 and worries that Oregon would become a “suicide center” 
for the terminally ill have not been substantiated.88  However, these 
statistics do not account for subtle acts of undue influence and coercion, 
such as when insurance providers deny coverage for life-prolonging 
treatment but cover the cost of MAiD medications.89  Such coverage 
practices do not send encouraging messages to terminally ill patients 
looking for ways to prolong their lives. 
C. Medical Aid in Dying Across the United States 
Of the nine jurisdictions that have enacted MAiD statutes, 90 most 
have modeled their laws after Oregon’s DWDA. 91  Washington was the 
first state to follow Oregon’s lead, enacting its DWDA by ballot initiative 
in 2009.92  Like in Oregon, statistics have shown that most DWDA 
decedents in Washington have been white, educated, and insured.93  In 
2017, the Washington legislature proposed a bill to add “the treatment for 
the purpose of cure and the treatment for the purpose of extending the 
patient’s life” to the possible alternatives the attending physician would 
have to inform a requesting patient about under the Washington DWDA.94  
The bill passed in the Senate on March 7, 2017, and it was reintroduced 
on January 8, 2018.95 
 
87. Id. at 6 (where most DWDA patients have been white, educated, and insured). 
88. Id. at 5.  In the twenty-plus years that Oregon’s DWDA has been in effect, only 2,217 
MAiD prescriptions have been written.  Id.  See also Courtney S. Campbell, Ten Years of 
“Death with Dignity”, THE NEW ATLANTIS 33, 36 (2008), 
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20081016_TNA22Campbell.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6SL-Z69U]. 
89. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II. 
90. See supra note 25 (detailing the jurisdictions with MAiD statutes). 
91. See Pope, supra note 37, at 280; see also Anne Marie Su, Note, Physician Assisted 
Suicide: Debunking the Myths Surrounding the Elderly, Poor, and Disabled, 10 HASTINGS 
RACE AND POVERTY L.J. 145, 163–65 (2013) (comparing specific provisions from Oregon’s 
DWDA to Washington’s DWDA). 
92. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.125.420 (West 2019); see also Pope, supra note 37, at 
280. 
93. See Washington State 2016 Death with Dignity Act Report, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF 
HEALTH 1, 6 tbl. 1 (Sept. 2017), https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/422-109-
DeathWithDignityAct2016.PDF [https://perma.cc/RR65-7ESZ] [hereinafter Washington State 
Report] (finding that of the 239 participants who died in 2016, ninety-seven percent were white, 
sixty-seven percent had some form of higher education, and ninety-two percent had some type 
of health insurance). 
94. See S.B. 5433, 65th Cong. (Wash. 2017); see also Washington, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/washington/ [https://perma.cc/PZP9-3DUY]. 
95. See Washington, supra note 94. 
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In 2013, Vermont became the third state to legalize MAiD, this time 
through legislation.96  Vermont’s Patient Choice and Control at the End of 
Life Act includes many of the same provisions as Oregon’s: requiring 
consultations with more than one physician, separate written requests, and 
physician protection from prescribing these lethal medications.97  In 2016, 
the Vermont Alliance for Ethical Healthcare initiated a lawsuit 
challenging the Act, claiming that physicians morally opposed to MAiD 
were being forced “to counsel their patients for physician-assisted 
suicide.”98  However, the district court found for the defendant, holding 
that the Act clearly stated that physicians are under no obligation to 
participate in MAiD.99 
In October 2015, California became the fourth state to legalize MAiD 
after passing its End of Life Option Act.100  The California Act is virtually 
identical to MAiD statutes in Oregon, Washington, and Vermont.101  In 
2018, the California Department of Health released its 2017 report on the 
use of the End of Life Option Act.102  This report yielded results similar 
to those in Oregon and Washington.103  The Colorado legislature passed 
its End of Life Options Act in 2016,104 and Washington, D.C.’s DWDA 
became effective in February 2017.105  Hawaii’s Our Care, Our Choice 
Act went into effect on January 1, 2019,106 and New Jersey passed the Aid 
 
96. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5281 (West 2019); see also Pope, supra note 37, at 280–
81. 
97. Bauer, supra note 71, at 1034. 
98. Complaint at 2, Vt. All. for Ethical Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoser, 274 F. Supp. 3d 227 (D. 
Vt. 2017) (No. 5:16-cv-205), 2016 WL 3971010. 
99. Vt. All. for Ethical Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoser, 274 F. Supp. 3d 227, 234 (D. Vt. 2017) 
(“Section 5286 permits a heath care facility to prohibit its physicians from writing prescriptions 
for lethal medication intended for terminally-ill patients in residence.  This provision authorizes 
an entire hospital, such as a religiously-based institution, to opt out of participating in assisted 
suicide.” (internal citations omitted)). 
100. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2019). 
101. See Pope, supra note 37, at 281; see generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 
(West 2019). 
102. See generally CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, CALIFORNIA END OF LIFE OPTION ACT 
2017 DATA REPORT 1 (June 2018), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/
CHSI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/2017EOLADataReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU96-
K439]. 
103. Id. at 6.  Most MAiD participants were white (88.9%), educated (54.8% had some 
form of higher-education degree), and had some known form of health insurance (84.3%).  Id. 
104. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-101 (West 2019). 
105. D.C. CODE § 7-661 (West 2019). 
106. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-327L (West 2019). 
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in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act on April 12, 2019.107  Most recently, 
Maine passed its Death with Dignity Act on June 12, 2019.108 
All nine jurisdictions with MAiD statutes provide similar provisions 
and outline detailed requirements for individuals who may obtain the 
lethal medication.109  Under each law, a patient must be at least eighteen 
years of age, be mentally competent to make the decision, have a terminal 
disease, and be free from undue influence or coercion.110  Each MAiD 
statute requires that physicians refer patients who may be suffering from 
a mental disorder or depression to a licensed psychiatrist or 
psychologist.111  However, as discussed previously, California’s MAiD 
statute is the only MAiD statute to include a specific provision against 
undue influence by insurers.112  Although there are many safeguards 
already in place to protect terminally ill patients, more needs to be done 
to protect against undue influence by patients’ insurers.113 
II. TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS ARE EXPOSED TO UNDUE INFLUENCE 
AND COERCION 
Before any jurisdictions in the United States permitted MAiD, the 
Supreme Court worried that its legalization would lead to involuntary 
euthanasia or abuses by physicians of vulnerable patients.114  However, 
these concerns have generally been unfounded.115  The Oregon statute 
requires seven different steps in order to obtain a MAiD prescription from 
a physician, and more than one physician is involved in the process.116  
Yet, although there is little evidence of any obvious coercion, there are 
subtle ways terminally ill patients are exposed to pressure to prematurely 
 
107. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-1 (West 2019). 
108. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2140 (2019). 
109. See supra note 25 (detailing the jurisdictions with MAiD statutes). 
110. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (West 2018). 
111. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-661.04(a)–(b) (West 2019). 
If, in the opinion of the attending physician or the consulting physician, a patient 
may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression 
causing impaired judgment, either physician shall refer the patient to counseling.  
No covered medication shall be prescribed until the patient receives counseling 
and the psychiatrist or psychologist performing the counseling determines that the 
patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression 
causing impaired judgment. 
Id. 
112. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.13(c) (West 2019). 
113. See, e.g., supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
114. See Su, supra note 91, at 146. 
115. Id. at 175.  Data from Oregon and Washington show that careful monitoring and 
safeguards are in place to protect patients from involuntarily ending their lives.  Id. 
116. Bauer, supra note 71, at 1030. 
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end their lives.117  Take Barbara Wagner and Randy Stroup, for 
example.118  LIPA’s letters could have influenced them to qualify for 
MAiD, had they felt out of options after their insurance company’s denial 
of coverage.119  Part II outlines the ways in which vulnerable patients may 
be unduly influenced into obtaining a MAiD prescription, including the 
costs of end-of-life care, the denial of certain life-prolonging treatments 
by health insurance providers, and the prevalence of depression in 
terminally ill patients. 
A. The Substantial Costs of End-of-Life Care 
Expenses for end-of-life care are extremely high.120  Medicare data 
shows that substantial health care expenditures are made in the last year 
of life, and especially in the last weeks of life.121  Approximately one-third 
of medical expenses for the last year of life are spent in the final month, 
with high-intensity therapies and other interventions accounting for nearly 
eighty percent of these costs.122  In 2009, Medicare paid fifty-five billion 
dollars for doctor and hospital bills alone during the last two months of 
patients’ lives.123  “[I]t has been estimated that [twenty] to [thirty] percent 
of these medical expenditures may have had no meaningful impact.”124  
“[O]pponents of the legalization of [MAiD] argue that, in order to reduce 
health care costs, physicians and insurance companies may aggressively 
encourage elderly and disabled patients to request prescriptions for the 
lethal dose of medication.”125 
In 2015, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMMS) 
released a potential plan to “reimburse physicians and other qualified 
health professionals . . . for having one or more discussions with Medicare 
patients and families about advance care planning.”126  Opponents of this 
counseling option argued that these payments would create “a bias against 
life-prolonging treatment and could exert pressure on some people to 
 
117. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
120. See Lewis, supra note 5, at 39. 
121. See Baohui Zhang et al., Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: Associations 
with End-of-Life Conversations, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 480, 482–84 (2009). 
122. Id. 
123. See Kerry Shannon, The Long (and Expensive) Good-Bye, FTI J. (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.ftijournal.com/article/the-long-and-expensive-good-bye [https://perma.cc/F85K-
C99A]; see also The Cost of Dying, CBS NEWS (Nov. 19, 2009), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-cost-of-dying/ [https://perma.cc/SA7B-B8GC]. 
124. See The Cost of Dying, supra note 123. 
125. Lewis, supra note 5, at 41. 
126. Noah & Feigenson, supra note 13, at 752–53. 
 
78 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:63 
forego medical treatment in order to reduce costs.”127  CMMS approved 
payment for voluntary end-of-life counseling in 2016.128  Medicare 
reimburses providers about eighty-six dollars per initial half-hour office 
visit, and about seventy-five dollars for each additional end-of-life 
counseling session.129 
Many low-income individuals rely on state Medicaid programs for 
health insurance, and, as a result of the Affordable Care Act, the number 
of economically disadvantaged people relying on Medicaid has increased.  
This increase will require states to look for ways to reduce costs, and 
opponents of MAiD fear that “Medicaid programs and private insurance 
companies may see the [MAiD] practice as a cost-saving 
measure. . . .  [T]erminally-ill patients with limited financial resources 
may be steered towards [MAiD].”130 
In 2014, the Institute of Medicine released a report, calling the United 
States’ system of caring for the terminally ill “largely broken” and “poorly 
designed to meet the needs of patients,” and pointing out the “need of 
major reorientation and restructuring” of Medicare and Medicaid.131  
Opponents of MAiD argue that mixing cost-cutting “treatment” such as 
MAiD with a “broken, cost-conscious heath care system” is dangerous to 
those whose health care costs are the highest—namely, the disabled, the 
elderly, and the terminally ill.132 
The terminally ill face extraordinarily high treatment costs.133  “Even 
with insurance, cancer patients often face unpredictable or unmanageable 
costs including high co-insurance, high deductibles, having to seek out-
of-network care, and needing a treatment that is not covered by their 
 
127. Id. at 753. 
128. See 575K Medicare Beneficiaries Participated in End-of-Life Counseling Last Year, 
Federal Data Show, ADVISORY BOARD (Aug. 16, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2017/08/16/medicare-eol [https://perma.cc/9P82-
XTLC]. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND 
HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE (2014); see also Diane 
Coleman, Who’s Really Hurt by Assisted Suicide, CNN (Nov. 4, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/03/opinion/coleman-assisted-suicide/index.html?hpt=hp_t4 
[https://perma.cc/Q9RS-G54V]. 
132. Coleman, supra note 131. 
133. See Elaine K. Howley, Why Is Cancer Treatment So Expensive?, U.S. NEWS (June 
20, 2018, 10:14 AM), https://health.usnews.com/health-care/patient-advice/articles/2018-06-
20/why-is-cancer-treatment-so-expensive [https://perma.cc/EN6B-LX43]. 
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plan.”134  A report from the Cancer Action Network found that “in 2014[,] 
cancer patients paid nearly [four] billion [dollars] out-of-pocket for cancer 
treatments.”135  Compare that with the low cost of MAiD medications.136 
Cancer treatment represents a significant portion of total U.S. health 
care spending, with roughly $87.8 billion spent on cancer-related care in 
2014.137  Globally, spending on anticancer drugs is about one hundred 
billion dollars per year, which is predicted to rise to $150 billion by 
2020.138  Anticancer drugs are expensive for a number of reasons: the high 
cost of drug development; the “monopoly” of cancer drugs; and patients’ 
willingness to pay the high price of treatment.139  However, many cancer 
patients cannot afford to pay these exorbitant costs.140  In the U.S., one-
third of cancer survivors between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four have 
incurred debt as a result of their treatment, with fifty-five percent owing 
more than $10,000 and three percent having declared bankruptcy.141 
The Cancer Action Network has proposed ways in which state and 
federal policymakers can address cancer patients’ costs: 
Ensuring cancer patients, survivors[,] and those at risk for cancer have 
access to health insurance that is adequate, available, affordable[,] and 
easy to understand[.] . . .  Providing all Americans access to no cost 
prevention and early detection services—preventing cancer and 
diagnosing it earlier can reduce patient costs[.] . . .  Passing public 
policies that prevent cancer and its costs to patients and society by 
reducing tobacco use and exposure to secondhand smoke, promoting 
healthy eating and active living, and protecting Americans from 
increased skin cancer risk associated with exposure to UV radiation 
emitted by indoor tanning devices[.]142 
 
134. Jennifer Singleterry, The Costs of Cancer: Addressing Patient Costs, CANCER 
ACTION NETWORK 1, 3 (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.fightcancer.org/policy-resources/costs-
cancer (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
135. Id. at 2. 
136. MAiD medications typically cost less than three hundred dollars per patient.  
Coleman, supra note 131. 
137. Singleterry, supra note 134, at 2. 
138. Vinay Prasad et al., The High Price of Anticancer Drugs: Origins, Implications, 
Barriers, Solutions, 14 NATURE REV. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1, 1 (2017). 
139. Mustaqeem Siddiqui & S. Vincent Rajkumar, The High Cost of Cancer Drugs and 
What We Can Do About It, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 935, 935–38 (Oct. 2012), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538397/ [https://perma.cc/Z9DA-XZB6]. 
140. See generally Singleterry, supra note 134. 
141. The State of Cancer Care in America, 2017: A Report by the American Society of 
Clinical Oncology, 13 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. e353, e360 (Apr. 2017) [hereinafter The State of 
Cancer Care]. 
142. Singleterry, supra note 134, at 3. 
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By enacting these policies, cancer-related costs would decrease, 
allowing cancer patients more control over their treatment and more 
options for their care.143  An increase in adequate health insurance would 
allow patients more freedom in their treatment options, and they would no 
longer be restricted based on their inability to pay.144 
B. Denial of Treatment Coverage Unduly Influences the Terminally Ill 
With the substantial medical costs and the insurance denials of certain 
physician-prescribed medications, terminally ill patients are often left 
without any options.145  They will either have to pay the expenses out of 
pocket, or else go without that physician-recommended treatment.146  
Health insurance plans do not always cover every treatment as a way to 
control their costs.147  As a result, “patient out-of-pocket costs increase 
considerably if the patient decides to proceed with the recommended 
course of treatment.  Costs for non-covered services do not count towards 
a patient’s out-of-pocket maximum (where applicable), so patient costs 
for non-covered treatments are unlimited and can add up quickly.”148  
Denial of treatment coverage requires that terminally ill patients consider 
alternative options, like MAiD or palliative care, when they otherwise 
would not have had their original treatment been covered.149 
Although data has shown that virtually all MAiD participants have 
insurance, the statistics fail to disclose whether any insured participants 
have been denied coverage for more expensive treatments, such as 
chemotherapy, that were specifically prescribed by their physicians.150  
For example, Stephanie Packer, a terminally ill California resident, 
alleged that her insurance company refused to cover more chemotherapy 
treatments after the state passed its End of Life Option Act.151 
Packer said that her insurance company initially indicated that it 
would cover a new chemotherapy drug at the recommendation of her 
doctors, but had “a change of heart” after California’s MAiD law was 
 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
146. See Singleterry, supra note 134, at 4–5. 
147. Id. at 18. 
148. Id. 
149. See generally id. 
150. 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 6. 
151. Bradford Richardson, Assisted-Suicide Law Prompts Insurance Company to Deny 
Coverage to Terminally Ill California Woman, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/20/assisted-suicide-law-prompts-insurance-
company-den [https://perma.cc/CER4-KNRT]. 
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passed.152  Packer’s physicians appealed the insurance company’s 
decision twice, without any success.153  Packer argued that the MAiD 
statute creates an incentive for insurance companies to deny terminally ill 
patients healthcare coverage.154  Speaking to The Washington Times, she 
said, “[P]atients fighting for a longer life end up getting denied treatment, 
because this will always be the cheapest option.”155 
Even for insured Americans, health care “coverage often falls 
short.”156  In 2007, medical debt accounted for sixty-two percent of 
personal bankruptcy filings, and the majority of these filers had some 
health insurance coverage.157  Health insurance denials often occur to the 
insurers’ “costliest customers—the seriously ill.”158  The reasons for 
insurance denials can range from a simple bookkeeping error to the more 
controversial finding that a patient’s procedure is not medically 
necessary.159  Patient advocates claim that insurance companies have 
become “increasingly aggressive” in denying claims, especially for costly 
treatments for diseases like cancer.160 
Denials of insurance coverage leave patients with fewer alternatives 
and may incite them to consider MAiD.161  As seen with Barbara Wagner 
and Randy Stroup, their insurance provider specifically offered MAiD as 
an alternative to their rejected treatment.162  This denial of treatment 
coverage may unduly influence vulnerable, terminally ill patients to 
consider the “cheap” options, rather than pursue expensive treatment.163  
Thus, insurance companies should not be permitted to push MAiD on 
terminally ill patients as a way to cut costs.164 
 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Caroline E. Mayer, The Health Claim Game, AARP (Nov./Dec. 2009), 
https://www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-09-2009/health_claim_game.html 
[https://perma.cc/C444-EHBK]. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. See, e.g., Andrea Peyser, Terminally Ill Mom Denied Treatment Coverage—But Gets 
Suicide Drug Approved, NY POST (Oct. 24, 2016, 12:28AM), https://nypost.com/
2016/10/24/terminally-ill-mom-denied-treatment-coverage-but-gets-suicide-drugs-approved/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y7KA-A5X6].  After Stephanie Packer was denied coverage of a 
chemotherapy drug, “she asked if the company covered the costs of drugs to put her to death.  
She was told the answer is yes—with a co-payment of $1.20.”  Id. 
162. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
163. See Singleterry, supra note 134, at 18. 
164. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Prevalence of Depression in Terminally Ill Patients Exposes 
Them to Undue Influence and Coercion 
When experiencing a terminal illness and the impending threat of 
death, individuals naturally may feel symptoms of depression: anxiety, 
sadness, loneliness, loss of energy, and reduced interest in activities.165  
Terminally ill patients’ “existential suffering manifests itself in feelings 
of meaninglessness, hopelessness, and futility.”166  However, it can be 
difficult to discern whether these symptoms are caused by the individual’s 
illness or an underlying depressive disorder.167 
People who wish to commit suicide are considered depressed.168  Yet 
a patient’s request for a physician’s help in hastening death may be the 
patient’s attempt to regain control over his or her life, rather than the result 
of an independent depressive disorder.169  It falls to the physicians, then, 
to determine the underlying root of the patient’s request.  MAiD statutes 
require that physicians refer patients to mental health professionals for 
counseling if they suspect that the patients are requesting MAiD because 
of a mental health condition, such as depression.170  However, few 
psychiatrists feel confident enough to diagnose a mental disorder in a 
single evaluation.171  This lack of confidence suggests that the safeguards 
currently in place may not be effective in preventing coercion. 
Researchers have found that psychological factors are associated with 
patients’ “considerations and planning” of MAiD.172  A 2000 study on 
terminally ill patients’ and their caregivers’ attitudes towards MAiD 
suggested a tension between the reasons people find MAiD acceptable 
(mainly pain management) and the “main factor motivating interest” in 
MAiD (patient depression).173  Ezekiel Emanuel and his colleagues found 
 
165. See HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 14, at 56. 
166. Id. 
167. Erica Cirino, Depression in the Face of a Terminal Illness and Death, HEALTHLINE 
(Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.healthline.com/health/depression/terminal-illness 
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or consulting physician] believes the patient has a psychiatric or psychological disorder that 
might impair judgment, then ‘either physician shall refer the patient for counseling . . . .’”). 
171. See Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Oregon Psychiatrists Toward Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1469, 1469–75 (1996). 
172. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia and 
Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Terminally Ill Patients and Their Caregivers, JAMA (Nov. 
15, 2000), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/193281#REF-JOC01512-4 
[https://perma.cc/34QD-8VX4]. 
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that about fifty percent of the terminally ill patients interested in MAiD 
changed their minds over the course of the study, and terminally ill 
patients who had not previously considered MAiD began to do so.174  The 
researchers concluded that physicians who receive requests for MAiD 
should recognize the patients’ “volatility and not take such requests as 
settled views but should evaluate patients for depression.”175  Patients with 
depressive symptoms were more likely to change their minds about 
considering MAiD.176 
Although each MAiD statute requires a physician to refer patients to 
a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist if the physician fears the patients 
are suffering from a mental disorder or depression,177 these referral rates 
are low.178  During 2018, Oregon reported that 249 prescriptions were 
written, but only three patients were referred for psychological or 
psychiatric evaluation.179  Likewise, during 2016, Washington reported 
that only five percent of DWDA participants were referred for psychiatric 
or psychological evaluation.180  Given the prevalence of depressive 
symptoms in dying patients,181 one would expect a higher rate of referrals 
for mental health evaluations. 
However, the low number of referrals is not the only problem: there 
is a shortage of mental health professionals willing to engage in this type 
of work.182  Many therapists object to MAiD on ethical grounds; others 
have financial reasons for refusing to evaluate.183  When these evaluations 
do occur, there are concerns about quality, as many psychiatrists feel that 
 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id.  Fortunately, patients retain autonomy over the physical act of ingesting the lethal 
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(Cinedigm 2011). 
177. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-661.04(a)–(b) (West 2019). 
178. See, e.g., 2018 DATA SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 7. 
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180. Washington State Report, supra note 93, at 9. 
181. See William Breitbart et al., Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for Hastened 
Death in Terminally Ill Patients With Cancer, 284 JAMA 2907, 2907, 2909 (Dec. 13, 2000), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/193350 [https://perma.cc/NS7V-SUUP] 
(“Desire for hastened death among terminally ill cancer patients is not uncommon.”). 
182. Susan Gilbert, Physician-Assisted Death: Trouble with Psychiatric Evaluations, THE 
HASTINGS CENTER (Oct. 17, 2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20170712184238/
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/physician-assisted-death-trouble-with-psychiatric-
evaluations/. 
183. Id.  “Surveys show that [forty-four] percent of psychiatrists and [twenty-two] percent 
of psychologists in Oregon oppose the [DWDA], and most of them would refuse to evaluate a 
patient who asked for a doctor’s help in committing suicide.”  Id.  Some therapists will not do 
evaluations if the patient is not covered by Medicare.  Id. 
 
84 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:63 
one evaluation is not enough to determine whether a patient has a mental 
illness that is impairing his or her judgment in requesting MAiD.184  
Although the majority of terminally ill patients who received MAiD are 
not depressed, there is still room for improvement.185 
Additionally, a patient’s fear of being a burden on family members is 
often a consideration for patients with chronic illnesses who wish to 
discontinue treatment.186  Medical professionals often underestimate this 
self-perceived burden experienced by patients, which has been associated 
with “negative psychological outcomes, such as suicidal ideation, loss of 
dignity, hopelessness, anxiety, and depression.”187  A Japanese study of 
terminally ill cancer patients concluded that patients’ self-perceived 
burden can cause “profound suffering and acts as a barrier to the 
achievement of an optimal quality of life.”188 
When terminally ill patients suffer from undiagnosed depression, and 
then are subsequently denied prescribed treatment coverage by their 
insurance provider, they may be unduly influenced into qualifying for 
MAiD.189  Although these instances may be rare, protections are needed 
to guard against these possibilities.190  More thorough screening for 
depression in the terminally ill will safeguard against these opportunities 
for undue influence and coercion, as well as an overall increase in mental 
evaluations for those applying for MAiD.191  Additionally, including 
specific provisions in states’ MAiD statutes that prevent insurers from 
pushing MAiD on patients could further protect depressed, terminally ill 
patients from undue influence and coercion.192 
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III. PROTECTING TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS FROM UNDUE INFLUENCE 
AND COERCION BY INSURERS 
Of the jurisdictions with MAiD statutes, each one includes provisions 
requiring that the patient be free from undue influence and coercion.193  
However, California is the only state to go one step further and specifically 
prohibit undue influence by a patient’s insurance company.194  The statute 
prohibits an insurance carrier from providing MAiD information to an 
individual, unless specifically requested by the patient or the patient’s 
physician.195 
Had a provision like the one found in California’s MAiD statute been 
included in Oregon’s statute, the unfortunate incidents of Barbara Wagner 
and Randy Stroup may have been avoided, where they were told that their 
insurance company would cover the cost of ending their lives.196  
However, this California provision permits insurance providers to deny 
life-prolonging treatment yet cover the cost of lethal medications.197  Thus, 
there is a need for specific safeguards in each MAiD statute to prevent 
insurers from covering life-ending treatment, but denying coverage for 
non-experimental, life-prolonging treatment.198 
A. Terminally Ill Patients and Futile Medical Treatment 
Over the last few decades, there has been a shift in the relationship 
between patients and physicians: there is now an increased emphasis on 
“shared decision-making” as the best way to determine important medical 
decisions.199  Today, patients are active participants in their treatment 
decisions.200  However, insurance companies enter into this relationship 
by “unilaterally deciding coverage and patient cost-sharing levels.  There 
is no meaningful dialogue among insurance companies, patients, and their 
physicians.”201  Health insurance companies can deny coverage of 
 
193. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.890 (West 2018) (“A person who coerces or exerts 
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treatments that patients and their physicians have decided upon with little 
or no input from either party.202 
In the case of terminally ill patients, insurance companies’ refusal of 
coverage often comes from their determination that a treatment may be 
“potentially inappropriate” or “futile.”203  Futility in medical treatment is 
an ancient concept.204  However, there is no uniform definition of medical 
futility, and state laws rarely define “medically futile” or “ineffective 
care.”205  The American Medical Association notes that it is not possible 
to offer a “single, universal definition of futility,” and instructs physicians 
to only recommend and provide interventions that are medically 
appropriate and that “reflect the physician’s considered medical judgment 
about the risks and likely benefits of available options in light of the 
patient’s goals for care.”206  Others argue that physicians must be “certain 
that an intervention will fail to accomplish its intended goal” before 
determining that the treatment would be medically futile.207  However, 
physicians will not always be right in their determination of futility; there 
are always exceptions.208 
Without a clear definition of “medical futility,” insurance providers 
are left to decide for themselves whether a particular treatment will be in 
vain, and reasonable minds can differ on what treatment is “futile.”209  For 
example, the Oregon Health Plan (Oregon’s Medicaid program) 
prioritizes “prevention services with evidence of effectiveness” and health 
maintenance.210  While ineffective, futile care is not covered, MAiD is, 
since it is considered a means of providing comfort—no different from 
 
202. Id. at 179. 
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Statement: Responding to Requests for Potentially Inappropriate Treatments in Intensive Care 
Units, 191 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1318, 1318 (June 1, 2015). 
204. Deborah L. Kasman, MD, When Is Medical Treatment Futile?, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL 
MED. 1053, 1053 (2004).  Hippocrates stated that physicians should “refuse to treat those who 
are overmastered by their disease, realizing that in such cases medicine is powerless.”  Id. 
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207. McCabe & Storm, supra note 205, at 207. 
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hospice care or pain medication.211  To Randy Stroup, treatment that 
would not cure, but would ease his pain and potentially extend his life by 
six months, was certainly not futile treatment.212  Yet this treatment was 
denied by the Oregon Health Plan.213  Stroup asked, “What is six months 
of life worth? . . . To me it’s worth a lot.  This is my life they’re playing 
with.”214 
B. Proposed Provisions that Each MAiD Statute Should Include 
Medicare and Medicaid profoundly influence end-of-life decisions 
for the elderly, the terminally ill, and disabled individuals because of what 
they will and will not pay for, along with a “host of incentives and 
regulatory restrictions.”215  Medicare covers approximately seventy-five 
percent of the people who die each year in the United States; thus, it is a 
“major force” influencing Americans’ end-of-life care.216  “As the single 
largest . . . health insurer [in the United States], Medicare also influences 
the policies of other insurance companies and thus indirectly plays a role 
in the way that everyone with health insurance dies in [this country].”217 
Because Medicaid “is a major source of financing for end-of-life 
care,”218 it is imperative that MAiD statutes include specific provisions 
that require federally- and state-funded insurers cover non-experimental 
treatment for terminally ill patients, should they cover MAiD 
medications.219  “Treatment is covered if medically necessary but not if 
experimental or investigational.”220  Therefore, patients who are eligible 
for MAiD should not be denied treatments that their physicians have 
prescribed. 
In every state where MAiD is legal, such statutes should include the 
following provision: 
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No publicly funded health insurer issuing a policy which provides 
coverage for medical aid in dying drugs shall exclude coverage of non-
experimental, effective treatment prescribed by a patient’s 
physician.221  A treatment is non-experimental “if it is widespread, 
safe, and a significant improvement on traditional therapies.”222  A 
treatment is effective if it will have “the effect it purports or is 
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling.”223 
Each state should also adopt California’s End of Life Option Act 
provision regarding insurance providers’ communications with terminally 
ill patients: 
An insurance carrier shall not provide any information in 
communications made to an individual about the availability of an aid-
in-dying drug absent a request by the individual or his or her attending 
physician at the behest of the individual.  Any communication shall 
not include both the denial of treatment and information as to the 
availability of aid-in-dying drug coverage.224 
By not providing any specific information about MAiD to 
individuals—unless specifically requested—patients will be protected 
against undue influence and coercion by their insurers.225  In the cases of 
Barbara Wagner and Randy Stroup, they were informed about MAiD after 
their physician-recommended treatments were denied.226  This caused 
outrage and anguish,227 and it could have unduly influenced them into 
requesting MAiD.  Including this provision within each state’s MAiD 
statute will help ensure that vulnerable patients are protected against 
undue influence by their insurers.228 
Medicare Part A covers, among other things, inpatient hospital stays, 
including cancer treatments received while in the hospital, blood, and 
some costs of clinical research studies while in the hospital.229  Medicare 
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Part B covers doctors’ visits, many chemotherapy drugs, some oral 
chemotherapy treatments, radiation treatments, outpatient surgeries, and 
more.230  Medicare Part D covers most prescription medications and some 
chemotherapy treatments and drugs.231  Based on these covered 
treatments, it is not unreasonable to ensure, through statute, that publicly 
funded health insurers cover the costs of effective, non-experimental 
treatment, particularly for those who qualify for MAiD.232 
If every state where MAiD is legal were to adopt both of these 
provisions in their MAiD statutes, vulnerable, terminally ill patients 
would have increased protection against undue influence and coercion, 
specifically by their insurance providers.233  Insurance companies would 
not be permitted to favor coverage of MAiD medications and deny 
coverage of physician-prescribed life-prolonging treatment.234  Treatment 
prescribed by one’s physician that is deemed non-experimental and 
effective should never be denied to patients.235  Insurance companies do 
not have the right to “play God,” determining whether or not a patient 
deserves the chance to prolong his or her life.  That decision should be left 
to the patient and his or her physician after discussing all the options 
available and the likelihood of success for each treatment option.236 
C. Addressing Arguments Against Such MAiD Provisions 
There are arguments to be made against including such provisions in 
each MAiD statute, some of which have merit.  However, the advantages 
of including such provisions and preventing undue influence and coercion 
by insurers far outweigh the drawbacks.237  One of the arguments against 
such provisions is that insurance companies cannot afford to pay for 
everything everyone wants; there simply is not enough money.238  About 
forty-eight million Americans sixty-five years and older are covered by 
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Medicare, as well as another nine million or so younger individuals with 
disabilities.239  If each person covered by Medicare were to request life-
prolonging cancer treatment, it would be impossible to cover everyone.240  
However, public policy weighs against covering the costs of physically 
causing someone to die, while denying the costs of continued treatment.241 
The cost of treating cancer has skyrocketed over recent years.242  In 
2000, the average yearly cost of a cancer treatment drug was less than ten 
thousand dollars.243  However, in 2012, twelve out of thirteen newly 
approved drugs for cancer cost more than one hundred thousand dollars.244  
Nevertheless, high treatment costs do not sufficiently justify the denial of 
coverage to persons in need.245  If the United States was to implement 
ways to lower cancer drug costs, treatment costs might become more 
affordable, and insurance companies would be able to provide more 
coverage.246 
There are many reasons why a terminally ill patient may opt for life-
prolonging treatment: the patient can manage the possible side effects of 
treatment; the patient does not think that treatment will interfere with his 
or her quality of life; or the patient has personal goals that he or she still 
wishes to pursue and achieve.247  Stephanie Packer, for example, said that 
her children motivated her to fight her terminal illness.248  Because a 
patient should have a say in his or her treatment decisions, these decisions 
should not be made solely because of an inability to pay for treatment.249 
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Another argument against including such MAiD provisions is that 
statistical data has shown that terminally ill patients are not being unduly 
influenced into prematurely ending their lives through MAiD.250  While 
that is true, not all acts of undue influence and coercion are overt.251  
Insurance companies may be unaware that their actions are subtly 
influencing terminally ill patients to consider MAiD.252  Patients may have 
undiagnosed depression; patients may have insurance, but their insurer has 
denied coverage of their treatment; or patients’ experiences as self-
perceived financial or emotional burdens may influence their end-of-life 
decisions.253  Although unprivileged groups, like minorities, the elderly, 
and the poor, are statistically not being coerced into MAiD,254 the 
terminally ill are subtly influenced and coerced by a variety of sources.255 
Protection against subtle acts of undue influence and coercion are as 
necessary as protection against overt acts.256 
Finally, opponents of these proposed provisions may argue that 
insurance companies are only denying futile treatment, and to cover futile 
treatment does more harm to the patient than good.257  Indeed, treating for 
the sake of treating, when there are absolutely no benefits, is 
unnecessary.258  The United States’ healthcare system should work to 
increase the utilization of hospice and palliative care.259  However, 
individuals like Barbara Wagner and Randy Stroup have shown that 
physicians may prescribe them effective, non-experimental treatments 
that their insurance providers nevertheless refuse to cover.260 
Barbara Wagner’s oncologist prescribed her Tarceva, a treatment 
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for certain types of 
lung cancer.261  According to trial results, patients who took Tarceva had 
a sixty-six percent lower risk of the cancer getting worse or of death than 
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those who received chemotherapy.262  “Tumors shrank or disappeared for 
[sixty-five] percent of patients who received Tarceva and [sixteen] percent 
of patients who received chemotherapy.”263  There was no basis for LIPA 
to deny Wagner coverage of Tarceva as “futile” medical treatment.264  Had 
the Oregon DWDA included the proposed provisions recommended in 
this Note, Wagner’s Tarceva medications never would have been denied, 
and she never would have received the letter from LIPA, telling her that 
they would cover the cost of ending her life.265 
While there is a need to avoid overtreatment at the end of life, these 
end-of-life decisions should be left to the patient and his or her physician, 
not the insurance company.266  The issue becomes apparent when patients 
are being denied coverage for effective, non-experimental treatment, but 
the cost of ending their lives is covered.267  While these instances may not 
be common, additional provisions in MAiD statutes would prevent them 
from ever occurring.268  Patients should have control over their end-of-life 
decisions, and cost should not be the main motivating factor in this 
process.269 
CONCLUSION 
Medical aid in dying has been a highly contested issue in the United 
States for many years.270  Although the Supreme Court did not identify a 
fundamental right to determine the time and manner of one’s death,271 
states have the ability to enact statutes that legalize the medical aid in 
dying process.272  This Note does not argue against the enactment of 
MAiD laws; rather, it outlines the importance of including specific 
provisions designed to protect vulnerable individuals against undue 
influence and coercion from a variety of sources.273 
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Specifically, this Note argues that MAiD statutes must protect 
vulnerable patients against undue influence by insurance providers.274  As 
seen in the cases of Barbara Wagner, Randy Stroup, and Stephanie Packer, 
insurance providers have the ability to deny patients physician-prescribed 
treatments, while offering coverage of MAiD medications.275  The lack of 
specific regulatory provisions in MAiD statutes regarding insurance 
companies exposes patients to undue influence and coercion.276  
Therefore, insurance companies must be regulated by MAiD statutes such 
that insurance payments for non-experimental, effective treatments 
prescribed by one’s physician may not be denied to any person who is 
qualified under an existing MAiD statute.277 
Regulating insurance companies in this manner can be achieved by 
including the specific provisions discussed above in each state’s MAiD 
statute.278  After outlining the vulnerability of terminally ill patients, the 
current process shows that there are not enough protections in place.279  
There are currently eighteen states considering the legalization of 
MAiD.280  Should any or all of these states decide to legalize MAiD, there 
will be more opportunities for abuse, undue influence, and coercion of 
terminally ill patients.281 
Any state that enacts a MAiD statute should include the proposed 
provisions outlined above in order to put increased safeguards in place for 
vulnerable patients.282  Each enacted MAiD statute already includes 
provisions that aim to protect this vulnerability of terminally ill patients,283 
and the proposed provisions of this Note would simply add to the 
protections in place to prevent undue influence and coercion.284  These 
provisions aim to prevent undue influence and coercion by one’s 
 
274. See supra Section II.A. 
275. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text. 
277. See supra Section III.B. 
278. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text. 
279. See supra Parts I–II. 
280. See Take Action in Your State, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/take-action/ (current as of Nov. 2, 2019).  The following 
states are currently considering MAiD: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
281. See supra Section II.B (discussing the exposure of terminally ill patients to undue 
influence and coercion). 
282. See supra Section III.B. 
283. See, e.g., supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (outlining the criteria to qualify 
for MAiD). 
284. See supra Section III.B. 
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insurance provider, hopefully avoiding the unfortunate incidents of 
Barbara Wagner, Randy Stroup, and Stephanie Packer in the future. 
